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ROBERT LAURENCE*

A Paradigmatic, Comparative, PrivateLaw Perspective on the Federal
Trusteeship
Dedication
For Toby Grossman, long-time Senior Staff Attorney at the
American Indian Law Center, mentrix to many who passed
through those offices and friend to all who did so. She was my
most constant reader,and while I did not often satisfy all of her
lofty criteria of good writing and good analysis, I was a better
writerfor having tried.
ABSTRACT
The trust responsibility that is the topic of the present
Symposium was established early on to be a status-based matter
of public law governing the relationship between the United
States and the various tribes and their members. The benefits of
this trusteeship, as well as its detriments, are manifest and are
discussed with insight and expertise by the other articles in the
Symposium. In this article, Professor Laurence takes a look from
the unusual perspective of private, not public, law. In an even
greater departure from traditional dogma, Professor Laurence
uses not private trust law, but private contracts law to serve as
the basis of his perspective, in particularfinding that there is - or
ought to be - a standardof enhanced goodfaith in all transactions
between the government (and private parties) and the tribes and
their members. Using a comparison from Australian Aboriginal
law, the article concludes not with a replacement model for the
present trust responsibility,but with what insights, if any, can be
gained from looking at an old problem from a markedly new
perspective.
INTRODUCTION
By almost every measure, the word "model" is preferable to
"paradigm." It is shorter, more easily pronounced, more widely
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understood, and clearer of meaning.' Except this: as an adjective,
"paradigmatic" is superior to the alternatives deriving from "model." 2
But what do I mean by the "paradigmatic perspective" of my title? To
suggest that I have in mind a new model of the federal trusteeship is to
suggest a grander mission than I have, for.I know that what I suggest is
not an analytic model of the entire field. Rather, I hope to add an
unusual look as part. of a broader search for a new model of the
trusteeship that is represented by this Symposium.
As the title goes on to suggest, that new perspective is both
comparative and private. Regarding the notion of comparative law, the
origins of this article lie in a series of communications that I had with
Professor Paul Martin, Director of the Agricultural Law Centre at the
University of New England in Armidale, New South Wales, followed by
a most enjoyable stay in Armidale during the month of June 2005.
Professor Martin shared a problem with me that the Centre has been
working on, which is described below and involves the protection of
Aboriginal intellectual property. For reasons that I will discuss, Professor
Martin's proposed solution to the problem involved the creation of a
private trust relationship, but as I thought through the problem, I found
myself thinking of a contractual solution. Thus, the present article will
propose a private-law take on an issue that has always been thought of
as a public-law concern and will do so by looking at some issues as they
arise in Australia.
I begin, though, with a statement of the problem.
THE AUSTRALIAN PROBLEM
It has become a common phenomenon for European-Australians
to interview Aboriginal Australians, seeking what would be known in
the West as intellectual property. This could be, for example, a white
anthropologist seeking historical information from an Aborigine. Other
examples might include medical experimenters seeking information
about traditional drug regimes or metallurgists seeking information

1. My much-loved 1969 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language shows that the origins of the word "paradigm" lie deep in the study of the
structure of language and gives the first definition as "[a] list of all the inflectional forms of
a word taken as an illustrative example of the conjugation or declension to which it
belongs." Only as the second definition is "[a]ny example or model" given. AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 950 (William Morris ed., 1969).
2. The American Heritage Dictionary gives no adjectival forms of "model," and the
made-up alternatives-"model-like" or "modelaic" -will not do.

Spring 2006]

A PRIVATE-LAW PERSPECTIVE

about the location of valuable deposits of natural resources. 3 The
question is how best to protect the interests of the informant, both
against the interviewer and against downstream recipients and users of
the information.
Having already called such information "intellectual property"
not once, but twice, I note the potential hazards of the commodification
of knowledge. Western legal tradition, of course, finds nothing
particularly remarkable about treating information as a commodity, but
it hardly goes without saying that not all non-Western cultures agree.
And among those cultures that do not, some would find it offensive to
traditional values, ways, and closely held beliefs to treat information as
private property, while others might find it merely oddly Western. I am
hardly an expert on Aboriginal ways, but Professor Martin presented the
problem to me, seeking an approach that avoided this Western
commodification.
Modern trade-secrets law might be used to protect such
information but seems to threaten the same kind of difficulty, that of
forcing non-Western concepts of information into handy Western legal
pigeonholes. Of course, in the end I will be discussing various Western
concepts of contracts, but perhaps because contract law is transactionbased and not property-based, there will be a diminished chance of
advancing the well-known principles of cultural chauvinism. We shall
see.
I begin with a brief overview of American Indian law, followed
by an even briefer overview of Australian Aboriginal law.
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
There are seven basic principles of American Indian law as
established by the domestic law of the United States, ignoring for present
purposes both the ancient and evolving body of tribal law and the
4
recently emerging body of international law.

3. As one of many examples, see Sandy Guy, Back to the Roots: Aboriginal Know-How
Tops Up the Top End's Herbarium, AUSTRALIAN WAY, July 2005, at 61 (Qantas in-flight
magazine).
4. The material for this section is largely drawn from Robert Laurence, The Basic
Principles of American Law as It Applies to American Indian Tribes, 6 Y.B. OF N.Z.
JURISPRUDENCE 35 (2002-2003).
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1. Tribes Are Governments
Tribes are much more than mere private voluntary
organizations.5 Tribes do the kinds of things that governments do: they
tax, 6 they regulate, 7 they adjudicate both civilS and criminal disputes, 9
they incarcerate, 10 and they enforce judgments." Tribes may, and do,
exercise the powers of governments, often against non-consenting
individuals. The recognition of this power by the federal courts is not
absolute, and certain exercises of power -especially with respect to nonIndians -are not recognized by the United States as legitimate, 12 so the
governmental status of the tribes under the domestic law of the United
States is not as extensive as is, say, its recognition of the sovereign status
of Australia. Nevertheless, the first basic principle of American Indian
law remains uniquely true: tribes are governments, and they act in that
capacity on a daily basis with the approval of the dominant society.
2. Tribal Sovereignty Is Inherent and Does Not Derivefrom the United States
Historically, the proposition that tribal sovereignty is inherent
and does not derive from the United States is unassailable: the tribes are
more ancient than the United States itself. As the Supreme Court in
McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax Commission admonished, "It must always
be remembered that the various Indian Tribes were once independent
and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates
that of our own Government." 13 Indeed, it would be illogical for a
younger government to be the source of the sovereignty for an older
government.
The inherency of tribal sovereignty was definitively established
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wheeler.14 In that case, the tribal
defendant, Wheeler, had been prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated
5. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
7. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Estate of Tasunke Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 23 Indian L. Rep.
6104 (Rosebud Sioux 1996). The legitimacy of this exercise of tribal civil adjudicatory power
was rejected in Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir.
1998). See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285 (1998).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App.
1997).
12. See infra notes 32-36.
13. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
14. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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by the Navajo Tribal Court on charges of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor. He then was re-prosecuted by the federal government, this
time for statutory rape, based on the very same acts of consensual
intercourse with a minor. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, such a dual prosecution would be
prohibited if the tribal prosecution were tantamount to a federal
prosecution. 15 But under the judicially established "dual sovereign
doctrine," two prosecutions of the same underlying acts by different
sovereign powers do not offend the Constitution. 16 The Court held that
the Navajo power to prosecute Mr. Wheeler did not derive from the
United States, so the second prosecution was valid. 17 The Navajo Tribe
was declared to be a sovereign independent of the United States and Mr.
Wheeler went to jail for the second time, in a decision that all, save him,
consider a great victory for the concept of tribal sovereignty.
3. The U.S. Constitution Does Not Bind Tribal Activity
Our Constitution, generally speaking, accomplishes these ends:
(1) it creates and grants powers to the federal government, i8 (2) it limits
the power of the states, 19 (3) it protects the states from federal
overreaching, 20 and (4) it protects individuals from the improper exercise
of both state and federal power.21 It is not the case that the Constitution
is silent regarding Indian tribes;22 however, the Supreme Court held in
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2.
16. Double Jeopardy and the Wheeler case are discussed in more detail in Robert
Laurence, Dominant-Society Law and Tribal Court Adjudication, 25 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1995). In
particular, it is noted there that the analysis changes if the first prosecution is in federal
court and the second prosecution in tribal court, due to the application of Principle 3. See
discussion infra.
17. VVheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes").
19. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation").
20. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
21. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, cl. 3 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law").
22. Indians are expressly mentioned two times in the Constitution: Article I, § 8, cl. 3
contains the Indian Commerce Clause, empowering Congress "to regulate commerce...
with the Indian Tribes." Article I, § 3, cl. 1 of the original Constitution, as amended by
Amendment XIV, § 2, cl. 1, apportions the House of Representatives by population,
"excluding Indians not taxed." These latter provisions have no modem importance, for
Indians are now taxed like everyone else, at least under federal law.
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the case of Talton v. Mayes 23 that the specific provisions of the Fifth
Amendment do not limit the activities of Indian tribal governments as
they do the federal government and, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the state governments. 24
It can be seen that this principle flows most directly from
Principle 2. Why would, in fact, the organic document creating the United
States in 1789 apply to governments a thousand years older than the one
being created? The tribes did not join in the drafting of the Constitution,
nor did they ratify it; they are referred to in it as entities with which the
United States has external relations. Their members are excluded from
the enumeration that apportions Congress. The Constitution only
provides its protections to people who are facing action by the federal or
the state governments. Thus, Talton v. Mayes makes eminent sense and
has stood the test of time; it is still good law.
4. The U.S. Congress Has Plenary Power over Tribal Affairs
Begin with this most basic proposition: No Act of Congress has
ever been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to be invalid as beyond the
constitutional power of Congress to act. For example, Congress was
permitted by the Court to enact a criminal code for Indian country in
United States v. Kagama25 and, in fact, had been practically invited to do
so by the Court in Ex parte Crow Dog.26 Likewise, the Court has accepted
without dispute the validity of the Indian Civil Rights Act,27 which
imposes a Bill-of-Rights regime on tribal governments. 28 The Court has
recently stricken key provisions of the federal Violence Against Women
23. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
24. Id. The specific provision of the Fifth Amendment at issue in Talton v. Mayes dealt
with the requirement of indictment by grand jury. Bob Talton had been convicted of
murder by the Cherokee tribe without the full protection of the Fifth Amendment. He
sought habeas corpus in the federal courts, which refused to order him released. The
Supreme Court affirmed and Bob Talton was hanged by the Cherokees.
25. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Kagama upheld the constitutionality of the Act of Mar. 3, 1885,
ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)).
26. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). In Crow Dog, the Court ordered the defendant released from
federal custody because the murder of one Indian by another in Indian country was not a
federal crime. The Court said, "To justify such a departure [from prior precedent], in such a
case, requires a clear expression of the intention of Congress, and that we have not been
able to find." Id. at 572. Congress responded by enacting the Act of Mar. 3, 1885, whose
constitutionality was upheld in Kagama. See supra note 25.
27. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000 & Supp. 2006). Section 1301 of the Indian Civil Rights
Act contains relevant definitions. Section 1302 is the substantive provision of the statute
and imposes on the tribes some, but not all, of the protections of individuals contained in
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1303 contains a habeas corpus
provision allowing one to attack one's incarceration by a tribal court.
28. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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Act 29 and the Gun-Free School Zones Act 3° as beyond the power of
Congress to enact, but few Indian-law scholars doubt the validity of a
hypothetical Violence Against Indian Women Act or Gun-Free Indian
School Zones Act.
We begin to see here the complexity of the field. The
congressional plenary power, a power without subject-matter limitation,
places a sizeable qualification next to Indian nationhood and the
sovereignty of the tribes becomes quasi-sovereignty at best. Indeed, for
some, the recognition under federal law of the plenary power of
Congress spoils the federal recognition of sovereignty that is found in
the first three basic principles. 31 From a logical perspective, the plenary
power is inconsistent, if not frankly contradictory, with notions of tribal
sovereignty. But from a public policy perspective, while the two are
perhaps at odds, they are no more so than many other policies that are at
odds in a diverse, vibrant society. Much like a well-tuned piano, which
has to be strung with strong, conflicting forces in order to make music,
the conflict between the plenary power, on the one hand, and the
concept of tribal sovereignty on the other, can be seen as the force that
holds American Indian law together and does not pull it apart.
However, in the past 25 years, the Supreme Court has added
another force that threatens to upset the dynamics of the balance just
described, as it has created, under the federal common law, a plenary
power running to the courts themselves that they may use to divest
tribes of sovereign power. This process began in 1978 with the case of
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,32 where the court held, in a poorly
reasoned case, that an Indian tribe has no power to prosecute a nonIndian for on-reservation activity. Duro v. Reina33 extended the Oliphant
holding to prevent the prosecution of Indians who are not members of
the prosecuting tribe. Montana v. United States34 extended Oliphantto civil
matters, restricting under the common law a tribe's ability to regulate the
on-reservation activities of non-Indians. Strate v. A-1 Contractors3s
29. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), declared unconstitutionalby Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), declared unconstitutionalby United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
31. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 WIs. L. REv. 219.
My response came in Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress
over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV.
413 (1988).
32. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
33. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
34. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
35. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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divested the tribes of civil adjudicatory authority over tort actions
between two non-Indians, and in Nevada v. Hicks 36 tribes were denied
the power to adjudicate a civil controversy between a tribal member and
off-reservation game wardens.
It is difficult to overstate the destructive nature of this trend of
judicial diminishment of tribal sovereignty via a common-law judicial
plenary power. Layer by layer, tribal power has been stripped away by
the Supreme Court on its own, all in the face of Congress's ability to
accomplish the same result democratically if it so wishes (which it
apparently does not, never having accomplished the same diminishment
legislatively). American Indians constitute less than one percent of
American society, so their representation in the national political process
is always problematic. Yet, through effective lobbying and through the
perception by many that Indians hold a high moral ground due to the
historical circumstances of their loss of the Continent, they have, of late,
received a largely friendly reception before Congress. The common-law
judicial diminishment of tribal power via the Oliphant-Hicks line of cases
is not subject to these democratic processes, 37 nor does the present
Supreme Court seem to find particularly relevant the high moral
position. Neither the concept of tribal sovereignty nor the structure of
American government is served well by the judicial activism represented
by this aggressive common law.
5. Federallaw - Constitutional,Statutory and Common Law - Works as a
Barrierto the On-ReservationApplication of State Law
Given the realities of American federalism, where so much of the
corpus of the law flows from the states and not the federal government,
it is not surprising that the competition between the states and the tribes
for the control of reservation activity has been intense and long-standing.
3
Indeed, both of the famous Cherokee cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 8
39
and Worcester v. Georgia, involved exactly that competition between
the tribe and the state. The tribe was the nominal loser of the earlier case,
as a majority of the Court held that the Cherokee Nation was not a
"foreign nation" for constitutional purposes. However, the tribe won the
moral and practical victory as four of the six Justices voting held with the
principle of tribal sovereignty, a principle that is with us still. And in the
second case, in which there was no tribe or individual Indian party, the
36. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
37. Except to the extent that, being common-law determinations, they can be overruled by statute. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
38. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
39. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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tribe nevertheless won, as the Court declared the attempts by Georgia to
regulate Rev. Worcester's activities on the reservation to be contrary to
federal law and void. Here, though, the practical victory may have gone
to the State of Georgia, first when President Andrew Jackson said, "John
Marshall has made his law; now let him enforce it," 4° and later when
most of the Cherokees were removed from Georgia and North Carolina
and re-settled in Oklahoma, a nineteenth-century ethnic cleansing that
the Cherokees call "The Trail of Tears."
Fortunately, the second half of the twentieth century brought
less dramatic battles between the states and the tribes, often fought out
over the mundane issues of taxation. In the process of deciding these
cases, the modem Court established a two-tiered analytical scheme.
When a state attempts to apply its laws on-reservation, a court should
first consider whether the state law runs afoul of conflicting federal law,
including Indian treaties and statutes passed under Congress's plenary
power. If it does, the state law is invalid pursuant to the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause. 41 If there is no direct or indirect conflict between state
and federal law, there remains a federal common-law inquiry into
whether the state action "infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them." 42 Supremacy Clause
analysis is much preferred by the Court to infringement analysis, but
both remain as viable defenses to the application of state law on Indian
reservations.
6. Treaties Are Enforceable,but Abrogable, Partsof the Supreme Law of the
Land
Treaties between the Indians and the Europeans were a feature
of the North American legal landscape from before the United States
40. There is some doubt whether President Jackson ever made the statement. See
Anton-Hermann Chroust, Did President Jackson Actually Threaten the Supreme Court of the
United States with Nonenforcement of Its Injunction Against the State of Georgia?,4 AM. J. LEGAL
HLIST. 76 (1960). Even if the words were not his, however, the sentiment was, and Worcester
v. Georgia threatened a grave constitutional crisis as the states and the central government
baffled for power in the early days of the Republic. See generally Joseph C. Burke, The
Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969). John
Quincy Adams' appraisal of the situation was that "the nation is about to founder." See 3
ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 544 (1919). The crisis was averted,

however, as the main political actors stepped back from the brink and the Governor of
Georgia was persuaded to pardon Rev. Worcester and release him, thereby making the
case moot. See Burke, supra. The brink remained, however, until, in 1861, South Carolina
fired on Fort Sumter and both sides fell into the chasm that we call the Civil War.
41. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); McClanahan
v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
42. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959).
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existed, and the new nation continued the tradition.43 By the time the
practice of treaty making ended in 1871, 44 more than 350 treaties had
been ratified. 45 Thereafter, formal treaties became unknown, but more
than 70 agreements between tribes and the United States were entered
46
into and were approved of by Congress, usually by way of legislation.
Treaties generally-that is without specific mention of Indian
treaties-were made the "supreme law of the land" by the
Constitution,47 as well they should be as they are ratified by a supermajority of the Senate and proclaimed by the President. Many cases
could be cited for the proposition that Indian treaties are an enforceable
part of the federal law of the United States; Worcester v. Georgia comes
immediately to mind as an early case applying a treaty between the
United States and the Cherokee tribe. 48 Not only are Indian treaties
enforceable, they are also subject to a generous set of canons of judicial
construction that can be summarized by saying that Indian treaties are to
be construed to the advantage of the weaker parties, who were
negotiating in a language other than their own, generally using
interpreters provided by the other side. Terms and conditions are to be
read as the Indians are presumed to have understood them and
ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the tribes. 49
The law with respect to treaties is not, however, entirely
favorable to the Indians. While the canons of construction remain
formally in place, and while the Supreme Court continually gives lip
service to them, one can point to cases where it is difficult to discern any
particular mission to resolve ambiguities in favor of the Indians.50 Even
more markedly, the Supreme Court has held that treaties may be
abrogated by one side acting alone, the reality of North American life
being that it is always the United States that is the abrogating party. It
was in the case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that the Court refused to enjoin
43. See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY (1994).

44. Treaty making was formally ended by the Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch.
120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000)).
45. See PRUCHA, supra note 43, app. B. The constitutional ratification process implicates
two branches of government. The Constitution provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
§ 2, cl.
2.
thirds of the Senators present concur...." U.S. CONST. art. 11,
46. See PRUCHA, supra note 43, app. C.
2.
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
48. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
49. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian
Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long a Time
Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1975).
50. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
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the implementation of an abrogating statute,51 and since the time of that
case there have been many instances of the abrogation of Indian treaties,
52
often via the diminishment of treaty-made reservations.
The Supreme Court decided in 1903 that Indian treaties were
abrogable by the United States, but it was not until 1980 that the Court
held that such abrogations may be compensable before the U.S. Claims
Court. In United States v. Sioux Nation,5 3 the Court established a "good
faith test," under which a treaty abrogation leads to a claim for monetary
damages if the federal government made no good faith attempt to
compensate the Indians for the abrogation at the time the treaty was
breached. If a good faith attempt to compensate the tribe existed at the
time of the abrogation, then the Court was willing to entertain the
presumption that the government was acting as a fiduciary, under the
seventh principle below, and managing the tribe's property as it thought
best. But, as Justice Cardozo had earlier written with his usual brief
eloquence, "Spoliation is not management," 54 and it is those abrogations
that are compensable. In Sioux Nation itself, the Court, over Chief Justice
Rehnquist's strong dissent, held that the government had abrogated the
treaty without good faith and affirmed the entry of the largest damages
judgment ever entered against the United States.5 5
7. The Federal Trusteeship, the Topic of the PresentSymposium, Frames the
Relationship between Tribes and the FederalGovernment
"Humanity," Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Johnson v.
M'Intosh,56 "acting on public opinion, has established, as a general rule,
that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed." 57 Here one finds
the origin of the trusteeship between the United States and the
conquered tribes. While one might wish that the word "wantonly"
would be seen as surplusage, the Chief Justice seems to be suggesting
that all conquest is inherently oppressive, but that restrictions, imposed
51. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
52. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329; Hagan v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975).
53. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
54. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476,498 (1937).
55. In a related case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that monetary
damages were the sole remedy for abrogation of a treaty and dismissed a quiet title suit
against the current land owners of property taken via the abrogation of the treaty at issue
in United States v. Sioux Nation. See Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation v.
United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981).
56. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
57. Id.
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by humanity on the conqueror, keep the oppression within the pale.
Marshall was more explicit in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,58 where he
59
described the Indians' condition as being in "a state of pupilage,"
noting that "[tlheir relation to the United States resembles that of a ward
to his guardian. " 6°
Nearly everyone is of two distinct minds regarding this
guardian-and-wardship and it is contemplation of this conflict that is the
aim of the present Symposium. Chief Justice Marshall's "state of
pupilage" was demeaning, even if consistent with the kind of divine
arrogance and effortless certainty in the superiority of European
civilization that was common in America then and today. On the other
hand, there is something that rings true in the notion that the United
States owes a higher responsibility toward the Indians than mere goodfaith, arm's-length dealing, a thought I will return to below. Having so
commonly breached the solemn obligations of a treaty, usually in order
to capture more tribal land to relieve the westward pressure applied by
immigrants from Europe, and having so commonly used ruthless
negotiation tactics in order to gain the Indians' consent to the treaty in
the first place,61 a higher standard for the latter-day dealing with the
58. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
59. Id. at 17.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998). In that case,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for the unanimous Court, quoted a communication from
John J. Cole, an emissary from the federal government to the Yankton representatives,
during a lengthy negotiation regarding the sale to the United States of lands guaranteed to
the Yankton Sioux tribe by the Treaty of 1858, 11 Stat. 743:
I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the
Great Father to-day [sic] for a living. Let the Government send out
instructions to your agent to cease to issue these rations, let the
Government instruct your agent to cease to issue your clothes... .Let the
Government instruct him to cease to issue your supplies, let him take
away the money to run your schools with, and I want to know what you
would do. Everything you are wearing and eating is gratuity. Take all this
away and throw this people wholly upon their own responsibility to take
care of themselves, and what would be the result? Not one-fourth of your
people could live through the winter, and when the grass grows again it
would be nourished by the dust of all the balance of your noble tribe.
Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 74 (53d Cong., 2d Sess.
1893-94) (transcribing Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 10, 1892))).
The issue before the Court in Yankton Sioux was whether the statute that followed
those negotiations was intended by Congress to result in the diminishment of the Yankton
reservation to merely the lands that remained with the tribe itself after the sale, or whether,
on the other hand, the sale of the lands to the United States, ratified by Congress via
statute, left the reservation boundary intact. The purpose of Justice O'Connor's quotation
seems to be that, with the hard negotiating position taken by the United States, as
exemplified by this communication, it was appropriate for the modem Court to interpret
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tribes seems appropriate. Judge Cardozo defined that standard as, "[n]ot
Only
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive ....
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher
than that trodden by the crowd." 62 And nowhere does this high standard
seem more deserved than when the United States deals today with the
tribes.
Although I shall, in due course, return to the subject of the trust
responsibility and the search for a paradigmatic perspective, I will first
briefly compare American Indian law and Australian Aboriginal law.
AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LAW COMPARED WITH AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW
"Aboriginal sovereignty over Australia has been denied in
practice and in law." 63 So wrote Garth Nettheim, who is Emeritus
Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales. As authority,
Professor Nettheim cited the case of Coe v. Commonwealth,64 and indeed
Justice Mason of the High Court in that case was very blunt:
In so far as the plaintiff's case as pleaded rests on a claim of
continuing sovereignty in the aboriginal people it is plainly
unarguable. It is inconsistent with the accepted legal
foundations of Australia deriving from British occupation
and settlement and the exercise of legislative authority over
Australia by the Parliament of the United Kingdom,
involving the establishment by statutes of that Parliament
of the colonial legislatures and subsequently the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia and the States as
constituent elements in the Federation. 65

the resulting sale and legislation as having been on the government's most extreme terms.
"Given the Tribe's evident concern with reaffirmance of the Government's obligations
under the 1858 Treaty, and the Commissioners' tendency to wield the payments as an
inducement to sign the agreement, we conclude that the saving clause pertains to the
continuance of annuities, not the 1858 borders." Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 347. Perhaps so,
but it is more than a little difficult today to read Mr. Cole's words to the effect that, if the
Indians do not sign, then three fourths of them will starve the following winter and that
will be alright with the government. Such a statement can give one a different perspective
from which to view the Statue of Liberty's lamp of welcome to the homeless downtrodden
of Europe.
62. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).
63. Garth Nettheim, Australian Aborigines and the Law, 2 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 371,
380 (1987).
64. (1978) 18 A.L.R. 592, affd, (1979) 24 A.L.R. 118.
65. Id.at 596.
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"Unarguable." A strong word, indeed. And earlier in the same case,
Justice Mason wrote the following, comparing Australian law to
American law:
There is, in all this, no justification for the view advanced
by the plaintiff's counsel that the plaintiff's case is that the
aboriginal people constitute a community within the
Australian nation and that this community is []itself a
sovereign nation. No doubt this submission is designed to
take advantage of the concept of a "domestic dependent
nation" mentioned by Marshall C.J. in Cherokee Nation v.
State of Georgia. It is, however, a submission which is quite
at odds with the case that is sought to be pleaded. 66
On appeal to the Full Court of the High Court, Justices Gibbs
and Aickin supported Justice Mason, thus resolving the case. Justice
Gibbs wrote,
[W]e were told in argument, it is intended to claim that
there is an aboriginal nation which has sovereignty over its
own people, notwithstanding that they remain citizens of
the Commonwealth; in other words, it is sought to treat the
aboriginal people of Australia as a domestic dependent
nation, to use the expression which Marshall CJ applied to
the Cherokee Nation of Indians [in] Cherokee Nation v. State
of Georgia....However, the history of the relationships
between the white settlers and the aboriginal peoples has
not been the same in Australia and in the United States, and
it is not possible to say, as was said by Marshall CJ of the
Cherokee Nation, that the aboriginal people of Australia
are organized as a "distinct political society separated from
others," or that they have been uniformly treated as a state.
The judgments in that case therefore provide no assistance
in determining the position in Australia. The aboriginal
people are subject to the laws of the Commonwealth and of
the States or Territories in which they respectively reside.
They have no legislative, executive or judicial organs by
which sovereignty might be exercised. If such organs
existed, they would have no powers, except such as the law

66. Id. at 595. I have by means of the empty square brackets removed the word "not"
from the Court's opinion, thinking it misplaced, superfluous, and contradictory. Perhaps
not, but in any event, with or without the "not," the Court's dismissal of the relevance of
Cherokee Nation v. Georgiais clear.
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of the Commonwealth, or of a State or Territory, might
confer upon them. The contention that there is in Australia
an aboriginal nation exercising sovereignty, even of a
67
limited kind, is quite impossible in law to maintain.
It would appear, then, that the Australian precedents reject the
dominant principle of American Indian law rather explicitly. There is,
though, one wrinkle in the jurisprudence. In the famous case of Mabo v.
6
Queensland (No. 2),
8 the High Court for the first time recognized the
concept of native title to land. Justice Brennan of the High Court wrote
this: "The preferable rule, supported by the authorities cited, is that a
69
mere change in sovereignty does not extinguish native title to land."
From an American perspective, the deprecating word "mere" is
inappropriate, but even with it Justice Brennan's quotation supports the
principle of Aboriginal sovereignty over the continent of Australia before
European contact. And this principle, in turn, makes our Justice
Thurgood Marshall's famous quotation apropos: "It must always be
remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and
sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that
of our own Government." 70
This quotation does not answer all Indian law questions here in
North America, nor does its application to Australia answer all
Aboriginal law questions there. But as a statement of appropriate
humility, made on behalf of the newcomers and their descendants, it has
never been bettered. Furthermore, unlike the situation in New Zealand,
where the Maori people are relative newcomers themselves to the island
they call Aotearoa, in Australia the Aboriginal claim to sovereignty is
very, very old -60,000 years is the present estimate 7 - thus pre-dating
even the Indians of North America.
The argument could be made, then, that the Mabo High Court's
mention of sovereignty is enough to bring Justice Marshall's humble
observation into play, causing the doctrine of Aboriginal sovereignty to
become part of the fabric of Australian law. However, the cases
following Mabo appear to take a contrary position. For example, in a later
stage of the Coe case mentioned above, Justice Mason wrote:
Mabo (No. 2) is entirely at odds with the notion that
sovereignty adverse to the Crown resides in the Aboriginal
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Coe, 24 A.L.R. at 128-29 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16).
(1992) 107 A.L.R. 1.
Id. at 41.
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,172-73 (1973).
See BILL BRYSON, IN A SUNBURNED COUNTRY 185 (2000).
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people of Australia. The decision is equally at odds with
the notion that there resides in the Aboriginal people a
limited kind of sovereignty embraced in the notion that
they are "a domestic dependent nation" entitled to
self-government and full rights (save the right of alienation)
or that as a free and independent people they are entitled to
any rights and interests other than those created or
recognised by the laws of the Commonwealth, the State of
New South Wales and the common law. Mabo (No. 2)
denied that the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over
Australia can be challenged in the municipal courts of this
country. Mabo (No. 2) recognised that land in the Murray
Islands was held by means of native title under the
paramount sovereignty of the Crown. The principles of law
which led to that result apply to the Australian mainland as
the judgments make clear. 72
Mabo, then, is seen as setting Australian Aboriginal law on a course
sharply different from American Indian law. And without the
recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty, the first three listed principles of
American Indian law disappear. 73
Regarding the fourth principle-the plenary power of Congress
over Indian affairs -it was not until 1967 that the central government of
the Commonwealth of Australia acquired any powers at all over
Aboriginal affairs, and this was done by constitutional amendment. 74
Thus, the history of the competition between the central government and
the states is nearly the opposite of that in the United States, where Indian
affairs were assigned to the Congress from the earliest days and the
75
States' role was limited, most substantially by Worcester v. Georgia.
In Australia, on the other hand, Aboriginal affairs were from the
earliest days assigned to the States and Territories, with the
Commonwealth government emerging as a major role player only in the
1960s. Thus, the fourth principle is much diminished in Australia, as, in
turn, is the fifth principle. In short, the States play a much more
prominent role in Australia than they do in the United States.

72. Coe v. Commonwealth (1993) 118 A.L.R. 193, 200.
73. As Professor Nettheim wrote, "It is, however, not always easy in the case of a
community to disentangle powers of ownership from powers which may more
appropriately be characterised as self-government." Nettheim, supra note 63, at 380.
74. See id. at 383.
75. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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The sixth principle is easy to dismiss for there was never any
treaty making with the Aboriginal clans, either by the British or, later, by
the Australians. 76
That brings us, then, to the seventh principle, the trust
responsibility, which is the topic of the present Symposium. Because the
trust responsibility is the only one of the principles that has not been
affirmatively rejected by Australian law, it is fertile ground for
exploration. And, indeed, Professor Paul Martin, the lead investigator of
the problem given at the outset, has taken a trust-approach as the best
way to protect the aboriginal interests involved. I, too, will now turn
there.
THE TRUST CONCEPT
The trust relationship can be created between parties who are
members of particular groups, or it can be created contractually between
individuals. It is the first situation that best describes the trust
responsibility that lies between the United States and the Indian tribes.
There are three ways that such a trust status might be created:
constitutionally, by statute, or under the common law. The origins of the
trusteeship that Chief Justice Marshall hinted at in Johnson v. McIntosh 77
and established in dicta in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia78 does not appear to
be constitutional, nor at that time was it statutory; rather it was a federal
common-law doctrine, created by the Court, as common-law courts often
do, to meet the needs of a changing world. 79 Later, of course, Congress
created a statutory trusteeship in several contexts, most notably in the
80
General Allotment Act.
This status is, of course, more than a little demeaning, especially
when it is created by the operation of law between the dominant society
(as trustee) and the subordinate society (as beneficiary). This debasement
76. Treaty making was going on between the United States and the Indian tribes at the
time that colonization began in Australia, and, indeed, treaties were being made between
the British and the tribes of British North America at the same time as well. But whether
the British appraisal of the North American experience was that treaty making was a failed
experiment, or whether the British appraisal was that the Aboriginal clans were less
appropriate treaty partners than were the Indian tribes, or whether the British were open to
treaties but the resistance came from the Aboriginal side, or whether this change in policy
had to do (as much of early Australian history does) with the establishment of the penal
colony, I do not know.
77. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
78. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
79. See United. States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
80. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (formerly codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-333).
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was perhaps best captured by the guardian-ward language of Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, based as it was on the observation that "[the
Cherokees] are in a state of pupilage," 81 a sentence that it is impossible to
read these days without squirming. Similarly, it is shocking to see
Indians listed with "[alged [p]ersons; [c]onvicts; [s]pendthrifts; [and]
[o]thers" in the fourth edition of Williston on Contracts.82 One of the
driving forces behind the present Symposium is the desire to reformulate
the trust responsibility in a way that removes the stigma of such a
wardship.
A broad-based Australian trust responsibility toward Native
Australians not having yet been established, 83 Professor Martin
understandably turned to the creation of a private, contractual trust to
serve the needs of the Aboriginal informant in the problem stated.
However, there are some problems with such a solution. First, the
property-law aspects of the privately created trust arguably represent, in
the context of this particular problem, a commodification of knowledge.
Such a result may be quite acceptable and ordinary in the context of
Western law, but it may be quite contrary to the closely held beliefs,
traditions and laws of non-Western aboriginal groups. Second, the
existence of a trusteeship is still at least potentially demeaning, perhaps
not to the extent of a trust via status, but nevertheless a trust created by
contract is premised on the need by one party, the beneficiary, to have
someone manage his or her affairs. Third, the contractual drafting that is
required threatens an explosion of legal mumbo-jumbo, even in the
context of protestations that the documentation must be in plain English.
In my experience, "plain English" in a contract is not the "plain English"
of the front page of a newspaper. Where I see most commonly these days
"plain English" contracts is in the context of insurance policies and credit
card agreements, which are both classic cases of contracts written by the
stronger party to look after its interest first.

81. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
82. 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 11:12 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 1993).
83. In separate opinions in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1, Justices
Toohey and Dawson turned their attention to the existence, or not, of an Australian
equivalent to the American federal trusteeship. Justice Dawson, dissenting, was strongly of
the mind that no trusteeship exists in Australia:
But once it is accepted, as I think it must be, that aboriginal title did not
survive the annexation of the Murray Islands, then there is no room for the
application of any fiduciary or trust obligation of the kind referred to in
[the Canadian case of Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335] or of a
broader nature.
107 A.L.R. at 129 (Dawson, J., dissenting). Justice Toohey was much more open to the
existence of a trusteeship. Id. at 156-60 (separate opinion of Toohey, J.).
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There is a further, hybrid kind of public-private trust
occasionally found in American law, where a person opts into something
like a trust arrangement privately, perhaps through contract. Having
opted-in voluntarily, however, the relation becomes a status from which
it is difficult or impossible to opt-out. An example would be an adoption,
where the adopting parent voluntarily undertakes the responsibilities of
parenthood, in what is essentially a court-sanctioned contractual
arrangement. Following the adoption, however, the parent cannot
merely determine to end the relationship, nor, in fact, can the parent and
child together terminate the relationship without the State's permission.
Likewise is the so-called "covenant marriage," where the parties
voluntarily agree to bind themselves to a more difficult divorce
procedure, and once having entered into that agreement, they may not
withdraw merely because they are so inclined. 84 The Governor and First
Lady of Arkansas recently made headlines by entering into a covenant
marriage8 and, indeed, the arrangement seems to becoming more
popular with 50-somethings, who have already learned each other's
various quirks after 30 years of marriage, than it is with 20-somethings
setting out on the adventure called marriage.
This generational difference is entirely sensible, and the Indianlaw implication of the phenomenon is this: for some tribes, after a
centuries-old relationship with the United States, the agreement to opt
into a very structured and protective trusteeship might make sense,
while for other tribes it may not. In Professor Martin's Australian
problem, however, when the arrangement is between strangers, or
virtual strangers, the creation by contract of a trusteeship difficult to
terminate may threaten a lengthier "marriage" than either party especially the weaker one -wants just now.
All of which leads me to propose a contract-law alternative to
the trusteeship, with details to follow in the section below. But note first
the transition from American Indian law, through Professor Martin's
approach to the Australian problem, to my contract-law alternative, first
to Professor Martin's approach, then back to American Indian law.
Under the principles of American law discussed throughout this
Symposium, a trust status exists between the United States and the tribes,
that status coming into existence by operation of public lawconstitutional, statutory, or common law-not by contract between
84. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (2002 & Supp. 2005). See generally
Chancey E. Brummer, The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: WhoHolds the Keys to Wedlock?, 25
U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L. REV. 261 (2003).
85. See David Holman, A New Covenant, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.
spectator.org/dsp-article.asp?artid=7844.
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individual persons or governments. That public law not existing in
Australia, Professor Martin proposes the creation of a trust status
between parties by private contract. Now, for reasons just given, I
propose that we abandon-for Professor Martin's problem initially, and
perhaps more broadly -the trust concept entirely and seek to protect the
various interests at stake through pure contract principles, principles
that I now set out in more detail.
THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF ENHANCED GOOD
FAITH
A contract may impose explicitly on the parties an obligation of
good faith in the performance of an agreement, and many do. Even if the
contract does not do so explicitly, there is ample authority for the
implied imposition of good faith upon the parties by operation of law.
This is true whether the contract is itself expressly made or is an impliedin-fact contract whose terms are shown not verbally but by the
surrounding circumstances. 86 This good-faith obligation could be
imposed via a statute, instructing the courts to find and imply it in every
87
contract of its kind, or it could be imposed via the common law.
There is also precedent for finding more than a standard,
honesty-based obligation of good faith as implied in a contract. There are
cases in which the standard is what I call enhanced good faith, where
something more than honesty alone is required of the parties. Does this
enhanced good faith reach the level of a fiduciary responsibility, defined
by Judge Cardozo to be "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"? 88
Perhaps not, but perhaps this is just where we want to be with a
contractual alternative to the trusteeship: some standard higher than
simple honesty (though that would be enough in some egregious cases),
but not so high as the potentially demeaning fiduciary standard.
Consider, if you will, the unlikely case (for this journal) of Empire
Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries, Co. 89 Empire Gas entered into a contract
with American Bakeries to convert the bakery's fleet of delivery trucks to
86. If there is no contract at all between the parties, then restitution theory, sometimes
known as unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, or "implied-in-law" contract, might still find
that the party that has been enriched owes compensation to the party who provided the
enrichment. See, e.g., Am. Automated Theatres, Inc. v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assocs.,
516 P.2d 565 (Okla. App. 1973). In situations such as these, restitution theory itself will take
the good faith of the parties into consideration in arriving at an equitable determination.
87.

See generally CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 441-77 (2003).

88. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
89. 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988).

Spring 2006]

A PRIVATE-LAW PERSPECTIVE

propane fuel and then to supply the fuel itself for the duration of the
contract. This contract was a requirements contract, so-called because the
quantity term was not set with precision, but rather in reference to the
requirements of the buyer. While the contract stated an estimate of 3,000
conversion units, it was intentionally indefinite as to exactly how many
units would be required or how much propane would be required
following conversion. Some short period of time after entering into the
contract, American Bakeries had second thoughts about the entire
conversion, but instead of cancelling or terminating the contract (which
it had no contractual right to do), it merely announced that it had
decided not to convert and that its requirements were zero with respect
to both the conversion units and propane. American Bakeries decided to
continue using gasoline. Empire Gas sued, alleging that American
Bakeries did not set its requirements at zero in good faith and was
therefore in breach of contract. Verdict was for the plaintiff, and the
holding was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The legal treatment of requirements contracts has a checkered
past because of the indefiniteness of the quantity term.90 The quantity
term in a contract, of course, is the one term in which indefiniteness can
be fatal. Nearly every other term-price, delivery date, delivery terms,
and so forth -can be provided by a court if the parties leave it indefinite.
For example, if the price is not given, the court in most cases can
approximate the parties' intention by applying the market price. 91 Or if
the delivery date is indefinite, the court can guess that the parties
intended a reasonable delivery date. 92 But what is a reasonable quantity?
For this reason, the courts have tended to require that the parties state
the quantity with some precision, and the Statute of Frauds in Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code states that no contract is
enforceable beyond the quantity given in the writing. 93
But what if the parties, as in Empire Gas, designate the quantity
by reference to what the buyer needs? Here the courts were ready to
accept the indefiniteness of the quantity term if there were some
enforceable limits on the ability of the buyer to manipulate its needs. 94
Generally speaking, these limitations came in two forms: First, the
contract had to limit, expressly or by implication, the buyer's freedom to
buy elsewhere, thereby reducing its needs to be satisfied under the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See generally 3 WILuiSTON ON CONTRAcTS § 7:7 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 1992).
See U.C.C. § 2-305 (amended 2003).
See U.C.C. § 2-309(1) (amended 2003).
See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (amended 2003).
See generally 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:7 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 1992).
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requirements contract.95 Second, the courts and later the statute imposed
on the buyer the obligation that its requirements be set in good faith.96 It is
this mention of good faith that justifies the discussion of Empire Gas,
working as I am toward an implied good faith standard in the contracts
called for by Professor Martin's problem.
Section 2-306(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code states, "A
term which measures the quantity by.. .the requirements of the buyer
means such actual.. .requirements as may occur in good faith, except that
no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in
the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable
prior.. .requirements may be... demanded." 97 Here, then, is an expression
of the statutory imposition of a good faith requirement into a contract,
even in the absence of an express mention of good faith. Now, at the time
when Empire Gas was decided, the term "good faith" had two definitions
under the Uniform Commercial Code, a subjective one and an objective
one. Subjectively, section 1-201(19) defined good faith as "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." Here, the inquiry was not what
the party should have done, but what it actually did, and whether that
action was actually honest. However, in Article Two, and only with
respect to merchants, section 2-103(1)(b) defined "good faith" more
objectively as, "in the case of a merchant.. .honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
98
trade."
However, in Empire Gas, the court had to deal with the bakery's
substantial under-order of zero conversion units and zero propane, and
the concomitant question of whether good faith-whether subjective or
objective-was enough of a reason for the buyer to set its requirements
at zero.
The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel, in an opinion written
by Judge Posner, first determined that the proportionality requirement of
the statute did not apply to under-orders in the same way that it applied
to over-orders and, in fact, the statute did not put any proportionality
requirement at all on an under-ordering buyer. 99 The court had a small
95. See, e.g., Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1985).
96. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (amended 2003).
97. Id. The statute at the same time speaks of contracts where the quantity is stated in
reference to the seller's outputs, and it is the editing out of all of the parallel references to
outputs contracts that creates all of the ellipses. U.C.C. § 2-306(2) (amended 2003) deals
with the related question of exclusive marketing agreements.
98. Recent amendments to Articles 1 and 2 have resulted in the abandonment of the
subjective test of good faith and the imposition on all parties, merchants or not, of the
objective standard, now found in section 1-201(23).
99. Empire Gas Corp. v. Am Bakeries, Co., 840 F.2d 1333,1337-38 (7th Cir. 1988).
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bit of section 2-306 text to hang its hat on: the natural reading of the
word "demanded" at the end of the section seemed to suggest to the
court that the clause regarding proportionality dealt only with those
situations where the buyer was demanding that an amount greater than
the stated estimate be tendered, and not where the buyer was demanding
that an amount smaller than the stated estimate be tendered. There is
certainly some sense behind this statutory construction, but if the reader
thinks that it is a thin reed, then Judge Posner would agree, for he
launched into a typical law-and-economics discussion of the differences
between under-orders and over-orders to support the court's
construction of the word "demanded." 1° °
Having done away with any notion that the bakery's zero underorder was absolutely prohibited by section 2-306, the court then turned
its attention to the question of what limits there were on such underorders, and here it focused on the term "good faith" in the statute.
Finding, for reasons that are not entirely satisfying, that neither the
definition of subjective good faith in section 1-201(19) nor the definition
of objective good faith in section 2-103 was adequate, the court
interpreted the term "good faith" in section 2-306(a) to require that the
buyer show what the court called a "valid business reason" for the
substantial - in this case zero - under-order10 1
I seem to have come a long way from the topic of this
Symposium, dealing as it does with the trust responsibility the United
States owes to the Indian nations. But I believe the digression is relevant,
as I admire the way that the Seventh Circuit dealt with the good faith
issues involved in the interpretation of section 2-306(a) and in particular
the way it enhanced the good faith requirement from pure subjective or
even objective good faith into something more -a valid business reason,

whatever that is.102

100. Id. at 1338.
101. The point of departure between the majority and the dissent was over where the
burden of proof lay: did the plaintiff, who was the seller, have the burden of showing that
defendant, who was the buyer, had no valid business reason for the under-order, or vice
versa? The majority thought that the plaintiff/seller had the initial burden of showing that
the defendant/buyer had the wherewithal to make the purchase, but that thereafter the
defendant/buyer had to justify the under-order by showing a valid business reason. In
Empire Gas, American Bakery had introduced no evidence at all of its reason for the underorder; therefore, the bakery lost. Id. at 1341. The dissenting judge thought that this was
tantamount to placing the burden of proof on the defendant. Id. at 134243 (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
102. Because American Bakeries had not attempted to justify its zero under-order at all
beyond the proclamation that it needed no conversion units and therefore no propane, the
Seventh Circuit never had to explain exactly what it meant by the phrase "valid business
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It is exactly this enhanced good faith that I find so useful, first in
solving Professor Martin's Australian problem, set forth initially, and
more generally as a new paradigmatic perspective on the federal
trusteeship here in the United States. I find helpful not so much the end
result of the Empire Gas case, establishing a "valid business reason" test
for substantial, disproportionate under-orders in requirements contracts,
but the legal method used by the Seventh Circuit in reaching that result.
That the good faith setting of the buyer's requirements in a requirements
contract is insisted upon is itself an appropriate first step, emphasizing
the otherwise indistinct setting of the important quantity term. But the
ability of the court to justify the ratcheting up of "good faith" from
subjective to objective and finally to enhanced shows, to me, the
common-law system at its finest. It is exactly the ability of a court to
move the law toward a situation unanticipated by the legislature that
makes the common law work, and no disparagement of the process as
"legislating from the bench" makes that work any less effective or
valuable.
CONCLUSION
To conclude then, I must say that, as a commercial law teacher
and not a property teacher, I prefer the notion of a contractually based
solution to a property-based solution. It certainly cures the problem
related to the commodification of information. And, it seems to me to be
less potentially demeaning than the creation of a trust, express or
implied. The public-private mix I mentioned above suggests that there
ought to be a way to have the recipient of the information undertake the
obligation of enhanced good faith in the contract with the provider, but
to prevent the recipient from obtaining consent to withdraw from the
obligation. The nature of the transaction would be essentially consensual
and arms' length, but the protection for the weaker party would lie not
in making the information given the object of a trust, but in the
regulation of the behavior of the parties both inter se and with third
parties.
Some part of the establishment of a standard of enhanced good
faith might be undertaken first before the legislature; recall that the
starting point for the Seventh Circuit in establishing the standard of
enhanced good faith was with the mention of "good faith" in section 2306(a). However, in Professor Martin's problem, the contractual

reason." There is considerable dicta in the case about what the phrase might be, but no
holding, which was left to later cases.
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approach does not need a statute, because, given willing recipients of the
knowledge, the contract could create the enhanced obligation explicitly.
Between tribes and the federal government, the need for
legislative action is greater than between individuals. If a tribe and the
government are contracting, then there is no reason that the principle of
enhanced good faith ought not to be imposed on both parties by the
common-law courts without the necessity of a legislative first step.
However, the straightforward application of the principles of enhanced
good faith to the trusteeship as it presently exists over much land in
Indian country is more problematic, if only for the fact that the present
trust responsibility restricts the alienability of the land. Hence, the
private, contractual, paradigmatic perspective that I propose here is, to
some extent, dependent on the more elaborate rethinking of the
trusteeship that my fellow contributors in this Symposium have
proposed in their articles. Beyond that, it would depend upon the
willingness of common-law judges to see and enforce the good-faith
obligation. As I mentioned, there is ample precedence for that, even
where the contract is not explicit regarding the obligation of good faith. I
actually think that the contract that I foresee will be less cumbersome
than the various trust proposals, just because it is easier to impose an
obligation of good faith than it is to create a trust, even where there is a
tangible trust corpus, let alone an intangible, intellectual property one.
Furthermore, I suspect that the idea of good faith and fair dealing crosses
cultural barriers more easily than does the idea of information as
property subject to trust rules.
Afterword
Having begun this essay with thoughts of the late Toby
Grossman, I am tempted to return to those thoughts at the end,
for symmetry's sake, that being an obscure allusion that she
would appreciate. But to dwell on the fact that this is one essay
that she won't read is more morose than I want to be. To mention
that I have tried to anticipate Toby's objections and speak to them
is both presumptuous and self-serving. To observe that the last
time I saw her was at the present Symposium would not be true;
it was at the one before this one.
So, how do I end? I used to tease her about the fact that she
took her margaritas with neither tequila nor salt, which made
them, in my estimation, limeade. And she would remark that she
liked them that way, and who cared about the name? Somehow I
think that within that comment lies an observation about good
faith and the trust responsibilitythat is worth remembering.

